As the world’s farthest-reaching and perhaps most vital industry, shipping is especially vulnerable the risks caused by geopolitical events. Dramatic developments, in war risk, illegal territorial expansion, cybercrime and global health issues all significantly challenged the maritime industry in 2022.
Set against this backdrop. Dryad Global have delivered actionable insights and decision-making support tools to the maritime industry, covering the immediate crisis facing shipping at the outbreak of the Ukraine war, developing geopolitical uncertainties in the Taiwan Strait, Iranian activity within the wider Middle Eastern Gulf, the continued threat of piracy within the Gulf of Guinea and mitigation tools for cybersecurity threats.
Never before has the threat to the commercial maritime market been so multifaceted and required impartial and nuanced analysis. In this report we have brought together experts from around the world to provide a unique perspective and insight on these global events and the implications for the shipping industry, both now and in the future.
Corey Ranslem, CEO Dryad Global foreword: https://youtu.be/MD9VeQNpS9E
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The State of Maritime Security
Overview
Dealing with trade backlogs, changing regulations, evolving piracy and complex regional sensitivities, the International Maritime Organisation IMO strives to maintain and improve safety at sea by developing international regulations applicable to all shipping nations.
Frederick Kenney is the IMO’s Director of Legal Affairs and External Regulations. A retired US rear admiral, Mr Kenney was formerly the Judge Advocate General of the US Coast Guard. He advises the IMO Secretary‑General on IMO legal issues (particularly treaty and maritime law), also managing IMO’s role as depositary for its 53 multilateral conventions.
In conjunction with their 2022 End Of Year Report, Dryad Global spoke with Mr Kenney about the IMO’s maritime safety and security concerns in a drastically changed geopolitical landscape – and possible related legislative changes.
Interview with Frederick Kenney: https://youtu.be/la1i3YN6p58
With multiple unprecedented complex geopolitical events unfolding globally, how does the IMO perceive its responsibility to promote safety and security at sea?
Since inception, the IMO implemented a new version of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) alongside international maritime conventions and codes relating to search and rescue, traffic and transport. The IMO makes sea trade and travel as safe and secure as possible by managing and mitigating threats via regulations and guidance. This developed significantly with the adoption of the ISPS code in 2002. Without its people, the industry doesn’t function. Therefore seafarer safety and regional preparedness are the IMO’s primary concern.
Following 11 September 2001, numerous incidents of misconduct exposed maritime vulnerabilities – making the ISPS Code vital to the industry. How effective has ISPS been in addressing global security issues since then?
The ISPS Code created a brand-new security regime, to be implemented by its Member States. Applicable to cargo and passenger ships over 500 gross tonnage, mobile offshore drilling units, port facilities serving international ships, and high-speed vessels. Concurrent Best Management Practices (BMP) evolved in the shipping industry, outlining appropriate procedures for responding to acts or attempted acts of maritime piracy and armed robbery in specific regions. These were supported and propagated by the IMO. Although it has never been amended, the Code has provided a stable regime that has been effectively implemented, with results that continue to develop and improve.
Cyber security is a growing issue across the maritime industry, affecting shipping companies, cruise lines, large yachts, and their supporting businesses – alongside various continually evolving geopolitical threats.
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The IMO saw that ship-based informational and operational technology can be hacked as easily as onshore systems, subsequently implementing cybersecurity guidance in 2021. In doing so, they sought to mitigate potential threats to ships, ports and wider maritime networks by raising industry awareness of and forming protocols for handling such risks.
While no plans exist to significantly alter ISPS Codes, the IMO are focused on specific areas within their security framework, including cyber threats.
The War in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine is the most significant risk event to have disrupted global maritime trade within 2022. The conflict has impacted the shipping industry in several ways, including: restricting freedom of navigation within the Black Sea; commercial disruption with Russia and Ukraine; and having to tackle the burden of sanctions placed on Russia and the associated increase in insurance premiums.
Despite significant limitations on the freedom of navigation throughout the Black Sea, vessels operating in the region and those participating in the UN brokered Grain Deal have been largely unaffected by ongoing military operations. However, vessels continue to face an increased threat from drifting sea mines, geopolitical uncertainty, and increased military traffic. There have been around 50 incidents of drifting sea mines sighted, destroyed, or detonated in the wider Black Sea since the conflict began in 2022, with approximately 30% of these occurring beyond Ukrainian waters.
Ukraine’s main ports were closed from the outset of the conflict. The subsequent UN-supported Grain Deal has facilitated the partial trading of some commodities from the Ukranian ports of Chornomorsk, Odesa Yuzhny. The deal itself, however, has been marred with continued uncertainty concerning its longevity and stability due to Russia regularly signalling its intent to withdraw from the agreement, leading to further commercial ambiguity.
At the onset of the conflict, a large number of vessels were stranded in Ukrainian ports and at anchor, and their crew members were left with no route to leaving the country. Further still, Russian vessels were severely restricted in available port calls, and more than a dozen Russian-owned yachts have been confiscated due to suspicions of violating sanctions. Russian vessels have been deprived of vital maritime services, and some ports have discontinued bunkering facilities for vessels that are owned or flagged by Russia.
As the conflict continues throughout 2023, Russia is proving to be increasingly limited in its available options for furthering its war aims. On shore, Russia is unable to consolidate gains or advance further into Ukraine owing to significant logistical issues. Within the maritime domain, Russia continues with ad-hoc targeting of Ukrainian port infrastructure at those ports not contained within the parameters of the grain deal.
At the current juncture in the conflict, it is apparent that there are likely only two viable courses of action against which events may evolve, neither of which are likely to see a Russian victory in Ukraine. Whilst much depends upon the anticipated Ukrainian counter offensive, there is a realistic possibility that the conflict results in a prolonged state of inertia on both sides. This scenario, inadvertently, may result in a situation where the risk of sudden escalation increases due to a heightened sense of complacency and the threat of miscalculation. If the conflict takes a course where the prospect of a Russian defeat looks more likely Russian military activity may present as increasingly more erratic or desperate. This is likely to be doubly so if the political tide began to turn within Russia itself. In such a scenario, it is a realistic possibility that Russian activity would extend to include substantial operations within the maritime domain, which may result lead to a significantly heightened short-term risk to commercial shipping within the Black Sea. Further still, in such an event, Russia may seek to begin targeting critical subsea infrastructure in areas beyond the Black Sea.
In conclusion, the evolving dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine and the potential ramifications of a Russian military defeat underscore the urgent need for international cooperation and decisive measures to mitigate the risks of escalation and safeguard regional stability.
The Indian Ocean Region
Throughout 2022, the northern Indian Ocean witnessed several maritime security incidents that had significant implications for the region. These included the targeted attack on the Israeli vessel M/T Pacific Zircon by Iran in November, a series of incidents involving Houthi rebels offshore of Hodeidah in Yemen and a number of attacks on vessels calling at southern Yemeni ports along the Gulf of Aden coast. Alongside such notable events were a number of smaller but no less tangible maritime security concerns in the form of robberies at key ports in India and approaches recorded within the Bab al Mandab and Gulf of Aden.
In November 2022, Iran’s role in targeting the M/T Pacific Zircon, an Israeli-owned vessel, stood out as a prominent maritime security event. The attack on the tanker, reportedly carried out by Iranian forces, involved the use of explosive-laden drones. This act of aggression resulted in substantial damage to the vessel’s hull. The incident drew international attention due to its connection to the broader pattern of Iran targeting Israeli-linked vessels in the region.
Simultaneously, Houthi rebels in Yemen played a significant role in maritime incidents offshore of Hodeidah within 2022, originating with the boarding and subsequent detention of the M/V RWABEE 20nm West Ras Isa Terminal in January. Whilst currently involved in a protracted peace process as well as a protracted conflict with the Yemeni government and its international allies, Houthi rebels continue to employ various asymmetric tactics in their actions. These have included the use of naval mines, coastal defence missiles, and unmanned explosive-laden boats. The targets of these attacks included commercial ships and military vessels, posing threats to maritime trade, the lives of seafarers, and the environment due to potential oil spills.
Within southern Yemen, several incidents highlighted the threat to vessels calling at ports in the region. These included two drone-driven explosions in close proximity to the M/T NISSOS KEA at the port of Ash Shihr, an attack on the al-Dhabba oil terminal by Houthi rebels, and an aerial drone attack on the cargo vessel ATA M at the port of Qena. These incidents underscored the volatile nature of the region and the challenges in maintaining maritime safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive security measures.
The combined effect of these incidents highlights the persistent challenges faced in ensuring maritime security in the northern Indian Ocean. The targeted attack on the M/T Pacific Zircon by Iran illustrated the ongoing tensions between Iran and Israel and the potential repercussions for states involved in perceived grievance with Iran. Meanwhile, Houthi rebel activities off the coast of Hodeidah highlighted the disruptive impact of regional conflicts on maritime operations, emphasizing the need for robust security measures.
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West African Region
In 2022, incidents of piracy and maritime crime continued to decline in the waters of Nigeria and the wider Gulf of Guinea. Increased regional and international collaboration likely played a significant role in the drop off in incidents, as governments and organisations worked together to combat piracy. Joint naval patrols, intelligence sharing, and coordinated responses to piracy incidents improved maritime security. Governments in the region also increased their law enforcement presence, deploying more naval vessels and patrol boats to piracy-prone areas. Additionally, counter-piracy legislation and prosecution were strengthened, criminalizing piracy and establishing specialized courts.
In conjunction with their 2022 End of Year Report, Dryad Global spoke with Dr. Okafor-Yarwood who is a Lecturer in the School of Geography and Sustainable Development at the University of St Andrews. She is a specialist in maritime security and governance, with a particular focus on the Gulf of Guinea. Her research has explored a range of issues related to maritime security, including illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, oil pollution, and climate change.
Interview with Dr. Okafor-Yarwood: https://youtu.be/6v70PyTbDNM
What are some of the key challenges facing the Gulf of Guinea in the continued fight against piracy and maritime crime?
The biggest challenge at a regional level is limitation of assets and not being able to coordinate their use between those who have such assets, and those who do not. On an international level, regional events are affected by larger international ones – given the international nature of some maritime crime, particularly piracy. The lack of cooperation and collaboration between nations is an issue in terms of sharing information.
Over recent years, we’ve seen a reduction in maritime crime rates in the Gulf of Guinea. What’s the primary driver behind this?
This is something of a contradiction because, while we’re seeing a decrease in some maritime crimes thanks to increased collaboration and cooperation on regional, national and international levels, criminals are unfortunately moving elsewhere: for instance, when it comes to oil theft and drug trafficking, criminals are having more success as our repulsion efforts drive their creativity.
But we are now seeing increased collaboration and cooperation between nations on this front, on regional and international levels.
Speaking of international assistance with deployable regional assets – to what extent can the Deep Blue Project (integrated national security and waterways protection infrastructure) be an effective tool to reduce crime and piracy in the Gulf?
When NIMASA and other Nigerian maritime agencies are fully integrated, I think they’ll be able to do far more effective work than they are currently. We’re seeing evidence of the Nigerian navy’s ability to work effectively and actually lead as an example showing that the Gulf of Guinea countries are able to secure their waters when they have the right assets, information and support.
What role should the international community play in safeguarding the maritime interests of the Gulf of Guinea?
They have a very important role to play. Many times the international community has the information, assets and financial wherewithal – plus the technical knowledge – to do the right thing. However, the reality is that certain nations seem to be very selective in which issues they prioritise. On an international level, there needs to be more honest cooperation and collaboration in how projects are supported, how the support provided is actually what is needed – directed at specific individual challenges. They need to ask “How can we help?”
Solving a problem requires different perspectives and approaches to be considered. At the end of the day, nobody knows it all and trying to solve a problem only looking through a particular lens can be very problematic – especially when there’s no real understanding of the social realities on the ground.
South East Asia
In 2022, South East Asia continued to face a number of unique maritime security concerns. The Strait of Malacca and Singapore and the Philippines experienced high levels of low-level maritime crime. Geopolitical instability persisted in the South China Sea due to territorial disputes, with China’s assertive actions exacerbating tensions. Additionally, the potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait threatened commercial maritime activity. Regional governments and international organizations prioritized cooperation and capacity-building to address these challenges, focusing on enhanced patrols, information sharing, and joint exercises. Efforts were made to promote a rules-based order, freedom of navigation and adherence to international law for stability in the region’s maritime domain.
In conjunction with their 2022 End of Year Report, Dryad Global spoke with Gregory B. Poling. Gregory directs the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a bipartisan, non-profit policy research organization, where he is also a senior fellow. He is a leading expert on disputes in the South China Sea disputes and conducts research on U.S. alliances and partnerships, democratization and governance in Southeast Asia, and maritime security across the Indo-Pacific.
Interview with Greg Poling: https://youtu.be/BV5_NRZM_vU
How likely is a Chinese maritime blockade of Taiwan – and what would trigger one?
This is the million-dollar question. It’s not particularly likely this year or next but looking back over a decade reveals that there’s a not-insignificant chance of Chinese military action against Taiwan.
This could take many forms:
- A full-scale invasion: the least likely but the option that could create the most escalatory possibilities.
- Either a complete maritime blockade or a blockade of ports like Kaohsiung.
- Most concerning, Chinese military action against smaller, more vulnerable Taiwanese outposts in the South China Sea, such as those on Pragas Reef and Itawamba
In any given year, these would all be low-risk possibilities, but with a fairly high-impact – so it’s irresponsible not to plan for such low-likelihood high-impact events.
From the perspective of the maritime industry and commercial shipping – how likely is it that China would impede the lawful passage of commercial shipping in the Taiwan Straits in response to an escalation on either side?
China may not try to block all transit through the Taiwan Strait. But they certainly could try to blockade key Taiwanese ports around Taipei and Kaohsiung.
More likely is that in the case of a conflict, seaborne trade will autonomously choose to divert around potential combat zones. And even if companies were not so inclined, their skyrocketing insurance premiums will ensure that they will be forced to divert around the Strait.
In the event of an escalation, we would see high risk areas posted by the maritime organisations, or insurance increases in JWC (Joint War Risk Committee) designated regions. This could be prohibitive enough for shipping companies and maritime interests to cease trade with Taiwan outright – which could have larger economic impacts.
In this context, companies and governments need to be a bit more sophisticated than simply asking about isolated events: “Will there be a blockade of the Strait of Malacca?” “Will there be a blockade of Taiwan’s Straits?”
In reality, the spigot of trade into the Indo-Pacific won’t be completely turned off in any of these scenarios – but certain ports, certain countries and thus certain parts of whole supply chains will become no-go zones.
In the case of a Taiwan blockade, obviously Taiwan would become one of these zones – and in this case, the trade implication is for semiconductors. In the South China Sea contingency, not all maritime traffic will be lost – but traffic coming to and from Thailand and Singapore will cease – so what are the consequent losses?
A Japanese auto manufacturer could lose its entire supply chain in Thailand. Major Fast Moving Consumer Goods manufacturers, like Samsung, would lose all their modern handheld production in Vietnam because there would simply be no way in or out without going through JWC waters, in the event of a Taiwan blockade.
Any South China Sea blockade would economically impact China – so would they consider whether blockading or trying to prohibit trade served their own long-term economic stability?
The so-called Malacca Dilemma – the idea that the US or Allies would close the Malacca Strait in order to choke off China’s access to vital resources, particularly energy from the Middle East – still looms large in the strategic thinking of some in Beijing and some in China’s military circles – even if it’s not an economic reality. The Choi gas pipeline continues to operate, built by China and running from the Burmese port of Chok-Piu up to Yunnan. This can, at maximum capacity, account for around 10% of China’s annual gas consumption – it’s a tiny safety valve, but not one that can replace seaborne trade outright.
Which security points from this region are most important for commercial shipping, cruise lines and large yachts in 2023?
Again, the maritime disputes across the Indo-Pacific, and particularly those around the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea and East China Sea, will remain risks for anybody operating in the region for the foreseeable future. We should be realistic about those risks, though – it’s unlikely that China or anybody else will seek to directly block commercial transit through these waterways.
Gulf of Mexico
In 2022, the Gulf of Mexico faced increased maritime security concerns, particularly in the Campeche Bay region. The rise in piracy incidents targeting static platforms, offshore supply vessels, and the local fishing industry was notable. These incidents are often characterised by violence but thus far are understood to not involve kidnapping. There is understood to be significant underreporting of the issue.
In conjunction with their 2022 End of Year Report, Dryad Global spoke with Dr. Alfonso Motta-Allen. Dr. Alfonso Motta-Allen is a Mexican-Canadian political scientist and retired naval officer. He is currently a senior research and project manager at the Independent Consultant. Dr. Motta-Allen has over 40 years of experience in public and diplomatic positions in security and intelligence. He served as a commissioned officer in the Mexican Navy for 25 years, retiring as a Lieutenant Commander. He also served as a diplomat for the Mexican Government in various countries, including the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Interview with Dr. Alfonso Motta-Allen: https://youtu.be/geZvsvSkRZc
Why is there a disparity between the reporting of maritime security incidents in the Mexican media and what is actually reported through the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)?
We need to examine the problem of under-reporting incidents in the Sea of Mexico through a more complex lens.
This under-reporting is created by three intertwined factors: The first being the Mexican people’s lack of confidence in their justice system. We’re transitioning through a great crisis of impunity – from every 100 crimes that occur, only 6 are reported. For every 100 reported cases of crime, only 14 are resolved. That takes us to a terrible figure – less than 1% of that activity is being resolved.
Long-standing disarticulation between coexisting port authorities: This disarticulation has made the processes of reporting crimes very difficult. Currently Mexico has been trying to resolve problems by putting most of these agencies under the command of the navy.
How the facts are criminalised in Mexico: piracy is being treated by the navy as a regular armed robbery, assault or attack. This is because in 2005, the Supreme Court of Mexico ruled about an interpretation of the constitution stating that the navy must exercise the rule of law over the waters in which Mexico has sovereign rights.
Even though the Supreme Court took in Article 58.2 of UNCLOS, the court gave more weight to an opportunity to combat the serious problems that Mexico has had for many years, and that is to do with drugs and human trafficking.
The maritime issue reports that were to be sent to the IMO were rerouted: the navy had to initially report to the federal attorney general’s office and present to the individuals involved – and that is where the navy’s previously permitted actions ended.
They couldn’t report further because they would be violating their due process. So technical investigations parallel to the criminal investigations of the justice authorities were never a customary role of the navy.
As a former part of the Mexican navy yourself, you have direct experience and insight. You’ve mentioned ISPS implementation – what is the Mexican navy doing now to help provide protection in higher risk areas?
In these areas, like the southern Gulf of Mexico, they are trying to increase their effectiveness by implementing permanent patrols and deploying important resources inland – maritime police and intelligence agents – with very good results. In the ports, they’re harmonising the obligations that all the port agencies need to follow. They’re implementing technological resources to raise their operational effectiveness, and increasing compliance with the ISPS.
Libya
In 2022, Libya continued to face a range of security challenges that had significant implications for the maritime domain. The ongoing conflict between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) remained a central issue, resulting in widespread violence, displacement, and an unstable environment within Libya. A notable development was the increased rate of inter-militia conflict towards the end of 2022. Foreign fighters and mercenaries were also involved in the conflict, further exacerbating the instability and impeding efforts towards lasting peace. The proliferation of weapons throughout the country posed a continuous risk, making Libya increasingly dangerous and heightening the potential for violence.
The security challenges experienced in Libya had a notable impact on the maritime domain. The conflict led to the closure of oil terminals and disruptions in maritime trade, adversely affecting the Libyan economy and impeding the country’s reconstruction efforts. The closure of oil terminals, including the Zueitina terminal, due to security concerns, directly contributed to a decline in oil production and exports. This had severe economic implications, making it difficult for Libya to meet its international obligations, including debt payments.
Of particular concern was an incident on March 8, 2022, involving the hijacking of the Morning Glory tanker carrying crude oil. Described both as a vessel detention by the LNA and an act of piracy, the incident highlighted the vulnerability of oil tankers to attacks. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) condemned the incident and emphasized the security risks posed to maritime traffic in the region. Similarly, the closure of the Zueitina oil terminal due to security concerns related to the ongoing conflict underscored the challenges faced by maritime operations and trade in the area.
The security situation in Libya remains complex and challenging, with no easy solution in sight. A peaceful resolution to the conflict and the strengthening of state institutions are crucial for long-term security in Libya and the maritime domain in the region. While reunification became a stronger topic of conversation between the opposing governing parties within Libya towards the end of 2022, it remains an unlikely possibility in the short- to medium-term. This stabilising goal will remain difficult to achieve if Libya continues to fail in addressing the underlying factors contributing to the conflict, combating the presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries, and implementing effective security measures—all of which are necessary to mitigate the security risks in Libya and create a stable environment for maritime operations. International cooperation and support continue to play a vital role in assisting Libya towards achieving security, stability, and economic prosperity.
Cyber Security in the Maritime Domain
Overview
World trade and supply chains chiefly depend on shipping, a singularly complex, profitable and now vulnerable sector. However, despite its importance to the global economy, the maritime industry, it’s people, vessels and infrastructure rely on disparate, outdated information and oerational technology.
Dryad Global talked to Prof Jones about the existing maritime cybersecurity landscape and how it is likely to evolve. He shared his views on what the industry ideally needs to do to mitigate cyber threats, and what the potential consequences of inaction or delayed action could be for global supply chains, commerce and security. Professor Jones is the head of the University of Plymouth’s Cyber-SHIP Lab. This government-partnered hardware-based maritime cybersecurity R&D platform is part of the University’s Maritime Cyber Threats research group.
Interview with Prof Kevin Jones: https://youtu.be/YoFIn2cDpQQ
The regulatory landscape has changed over recent years – it’s improved through initiatives like IMO 2020 and additional regulations implemented by the US Coast Guard. It’s also inevitable that more regulations will follow. But what are the prominent vulnerabilities regarding maritime cybersecurity?
There are several answers here. The first industry problem is awareness: there are still many people who think that even progressive regulations like IMO 2020 and the US Coast Guard’s implementations are unnecessary, because the industry “doesn’t have a problem with cybersecurity”. There’s now irrefutable evidence that this is no longer true – while it may have been a while ago, it certainly isn’t today. Until the sector catches onto the idea that this is an enduring problem that needs appropriate attention, there’s going to be a ‘follower’ mentality: where people are not proactive in pre-empting and preventing problems.
The lion’s share of goods we use are transported by ships – so any attack on the shipping infrastructure (ships, fleet management and physical companies) could potentially have devastating effects on the global economy. How has the attack landscape changed in terms of attack types from five years ago to today?
There were very few targeted attacks on the maritime sector. If there were, they tended to be at nation state level – things like large-scale GPS spoofing to investigate the attackers’ capability for doing those things. Maritime cyber-attacks are becoming a profitable mechanism that can be exploited by organisations up to the level of worldwide organised crime. Most of the major shipping lines have been hit at some level or another in the last couple of years, and this wasn’t the case five or six years ago. So that change has happened, in the same way as the banking sector: two decades ago they went from “we don’t have to worry about it” to “we are a prime target.”
With the evolution of cyber and criminal targeting against the maritime industry, do current regulatory frameworks adequately address cyber threats, or is there more that needs to be done?
Firstly, it is good that something is being done, because something is always better than nothing – and the fact that the IMO now has a regulatory framework that requires cyber risks to be considered is clearly a positive step forward. If you really look at the meat of that regulation, it simply states that “cyber risk has to be considered.” It doesn’t say you have to be able to do anything about it or fully understand the nuances of your consideration.
We’ve gone from obliviousness and not caring about cyber to driving an awareness that hopefully instils a more responsible future stance and actions from the industry. How do you think the maritime cyber-attack landscape will change over the coming years?
The attack landscape is going to get worse – more and more people will realise the benefits they can get from maritime cybercrime. More and more tools will be developed to specifically target the sector.
If you look at other parts of the space, there are tools that were originally only accessible by the NSA which you can now buy for a couple hundred bucks on the darkweb. So now, fairly low-end criminals have capabilities that were nation state-level just a few years ago.
What we’re seeing is increasing numbers of purpose-designed tools being developed by criminals. Maritime is going to be part of that mix.
In summary, the sector’s had a bit of a respite that the rest of the world hasn’t, in terms of the classic situation of “we’re out at sea, we’re an island, we don’t have to worry about this cyber internet stuff” existing until now.
That period is over: there will be a rapid escalation until the maritime sector achieves the same security level as banking, road transport, power or any of the other sectors. Then it’ll be a level playing field for where attention will go – and the intelligent will say, “Maritime is still actually an interesting place for malicious activity, so it’s also an interesting place to develop mitigations.”
Source: Dryad Global
